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The Weakest Link: The Risks Associated with Social Networking
Websites
Abstract
The relatively rapid rise in popularity of social networking services is now well known.
MySpace, Twitter, and Facebook have become well known sites and terms. According to the
Web traffic tracking site Alexa.com, as of December 2009, Facebook had 350 million
registered users, MySpace just under 475 million, and Twitter 44.5 million. Many people
think very little of posting prodigious amounts of personal information on social networking
sites, not realizing that this information puts them at risk. Specifically, those in the law
enforcement and military communities may not realize that information posted on these
sites can compromise operational security and potentially endanger lives. In July 2009, the
Associated Press ran a story which was picked up by most major news outlets in the USA,
in which it was reported that the wife of the incoming head of Britain's MI6 intelligence
agency had posted pictures and family details on her Facebook page. Astonishingly, there
were those that argued that this was not a security breach! Although it is true that, in
general, photos of a vacationing family would not be considered sensitive, when you
consider that the family taking the vacation includes the head of the British foreign
intelligence service, it is easy to see how this kind of exposure could open the door to
potential blackmail.We are all too aware of the possibility of terrorist "sleeper cells" living
among typical American families under false identities. It is vital to understand how these
individuals melt into the crowd, hiding their true identities while they hatch their nefarious
plots. Recent events in Denver and New York City only serve to underscore the urgency of
this need. This article will examine social networking in the context of social engineering.
There are no easy or fast solutions to this problem, and this paper does not pretend to
propose any. Rather, it is the purpose of this paper to enhance understanding of this very
critical issue, and perhaps assist organizations and security professionals in developing
policies and training which will mitigate this risk.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/7

Lehrman: The Weakest Link: The Risks Associated with Social Networking Web

The Weakest Link: The Risks
Associated with Social Networking
Websites
By Yosef Lehrman1

Introduction
The relatively rapid rise in popularity of social networking services is now
well known. MySpace, Twitter, and Facebook have become well known
sites and terms. According to the Web traffic tracking site Alexa.com, as of
December 2009, Facebook had 350 million registered users,2 MySpace
just under 475 million,3 and Twitter 44.5 million.4 Many people think
very little of posting prodigious amounts of personal information on
social networking sites, not realizing that this information puts them at
risk. Specifically, those in the law enforcement and military communities
may not realize that information posted on these sites can compromise
operational security and potentially endanger lives. In July 2009, the
Associated Press ran a story which was picked up by most major news
outlets in the USA, in which it was reported that the wife of the incoming
head of Britain's MI6 intelligence agency had posted pictures and family
details on her Facebook page.5 Astonishingly, there were those that
argued that this was not a security breach! Although it is true that, in general, photos of a vacationing family would not be considered sensitive,
when you consider that the family taking the vacation includes the head of
the British foreign intelligence service, it is easy to see how this kind of
exposure could open the door to potential blackmail.
We are all too aware of the possibility of terrorist "sleeper cells" living
among typical American families under false identities. It is vital to
understand how these individuals melt into the crowd, hiding their true
identities while they hatch their nefarious plots. Recent events in Denver
and New York City6 only serve to underscore the urgency of this need.
This article will examine social networking in the context of social engineering. There are no easy or fast solutions to this problem, and this
paper does not pretend to propose any. Rather, it is the purpose of this
paper to enhance understanding of this very critical issue, and perhaps
assist organizations and security professionals in developing policies and
training which will mitigate this risk.
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The Weakest Link: The Human Factor
Imagine a security analyst, hired to probe an organization's security and
determine potential entry points that can be exploited by an attacker. The
company in question is so security conscious that it has spared no expense
on both physical and cyber security systems. The company has extremely
detailed and rigorous security policies and training, which are mandated
for all employees. There are no passwords under keyboards or taped to
the side of the computer monitors. Individuals walking the halls without
proper identification displayed can expect to be stopped and questioned.
Administrators are conscientious about making sure all security patches
and antivirus updates are applied to their systems; it goes without saying
that every system is equipped with antivirus and firewall software. Most
people would be impressed with the level of security at this company.
However, if the assessment was done correctly, it will show that this company is still highly vulnerable to a security breach.
How can a company such as this one be vulnerable? The answer is that
unless the company has a clear plan and mandated training and retraining of all employees, a determined attacker can gain access to highly sensitive information by simply asking for it. According to testimony by
security consultant (and reformed hacker) Kevin Mitnick before the U.S.
Senate in March of 2000, he was routinely able to gain access to sensitive
information just by asking for it.7 Many companies cling to the illusion
that their data is secure because of their investment in a cutting edge technological security solution, such as "biometrics,"8 "two-factor authentication,"9 or "smart cards."10 However, treating security as a purely
technological problem virtually guarantees that these organizations will
suffer a security breach, as they have overlooked the weakest link in the
chain of security—the human factor. Indeed, as the technological barriers
to cracking a network's defenses are strengthened, it becomes more propitious for attackers to attempt to break into a network via the human element. This typically takes no more than a phone call or two, and involves
minimal risk, while yielding a potentially substantial payoff.

Social Engineering and Abuse of Trust
To break the "weakest link" and defeat security measures by exploiting
the human factor, an attacker must find a way to trick a trusted user into
providing access or revealing information. This type of action is referred
to as social engineering. Social engineering is defined as "the act of
manipulating people into performing actions or divulging confidential
information, rather than by breaking in or using technical hacking tech64

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.2.7

Lehrman: The Weakest Link: The Risks Associated with Social Networking Web

The Weakest Link: The Risks Associated with Social Networking Websites

niques."11 Social engineers (the term used to describe those who engage in
social engineering) typically exhibit strong people skills; they are charming and likable. Particularly in Western societies, where people live their
lives with the assumption that the majority of people are not trying to
deceive them, and the overall probability of being misled is low, people
tend to lose sight of this threat. A good social engineer will exploit this
innate trust in other human beings, and make a request that sounds so
reasonable that it raises no suspicion at all. However, it is possible that
any information provided, no matter how innocuous it seems, can be that
final piece of information needed to complete the attack.
There are many examples of attacks which were carried out with what
appears to have been harmless information. In September 2008, it was
reported that the personal email account of Sarah Palin had been accessed
by an unauthorized user.12 At the time, Palin was Governor of Alaska, as
well as the Republican Vice Presidential nominee. Amazingly, the attacker
accessed her email with astonishing ease. First, the alleged attacker
acquired the username (which was easy to do, as that is typically the same
as the first portion of her email address), and then misrepresented himself as her, by claiming to be the legitimate owner of the account and having forgetten the account password. The email provider then requested
some personal information such as zip code, high school, etc. to reset the
password. This information was easily obtained via Internet search
engines. The actual attack took under one hour to pull off. Would people
post the password to their email accounts online? Obviously not. However, many people see nothing wrong with posting tremendous amounts
of personal information online, perhaps reasoning that little harm can
result, since after all, it is only one single piece of information, which in
and of itself is worthless. In truth though, the attacker uses these bits of
information to compile a complete profile of the victim, which can then be
used to mount a succesfull attack. Indeed, the May 2009 attack against
Twitter.com utilized this method.13

Social Networks: A Potential Security Risk
While social networking services have become widely known and
immensely popular, few realize the significant security risks that they
present. Social networking services provide a large amount of personal
information and raw data about people, organizations, and governments,
which can be accessed relatively easy and anonymously. This information
can then be used to target the victim. The United States military has recognized this as a concern, specifically as it relates to government employees and military service members. There have been articles in several Air
65
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Force Base newspapers discussing the risk that social networking posts
can pose to operational security. According to the results of a study of 500
U.S. Air Force members with MySpace profiles, over 300 individuals provided enough information on MySpace to make them vulnerable to a
cyber-attack or blackmail—in military parlance "adversary targeting."14
Fewer than 100 members were found to have low vulnerability (A graphical representation of the results of the study is provided in Figure 1). Vulnerability was established by how much information was provided,
including name, hometown and state, duty location, job type, and
whether the profile was public or private. In summary, the report found
that over 60% of the members surveyed posted too much information.

Figure 1: Percentages of USAF Personnel Posting on MySpace
Vulnerable to Adversary Targeting
Social networking services have evolved dramatically from their inception
in the late 1990s. What began as a venue for allowing people to meet and
link with each other via email, has morphed into complex web-based
sites, where people can maintain a "buddy list" of friends, chat with them
in real time (instant messaging), and use a variety of applications built
into the site to communicate. In so doing, these services have brought an
inordinate amount of previously private information into the public
domain. One mechanism by which social engineers can manipulate users
of social networking sites is by actually becoming online "friends" with the
target. Once the friendship is confirmed, the social engineer will then proceed to mine the victim for the information he or she is looking for; carefully planting key questions into an otherwise normal conversation. The
myriad of risks that this issue can pose to military personnel was identi66
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fied by the military over two years ago. To quote U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt.
Joshua Liebold, "As far as people talking about themselves...a foreign spy
information gatherer could look at [your information] and say, 'OK, that
might be something to look into. Let's be their friend on MySpace.'...They
mine you for information."15 In fact, in August 2009, the U.S. Marine
Corps issued a one-year ban on accessing social networking sites from its
enterprise network, due to security concerns.16

Social Networking and Cyber Attacks
Another mechanism through which social engineers can leverage social
networking services in a cyber attack is to gain the trust of the target by
pretending to be a user who is trusted by the target. A classic example of
this "abuse of trust" is the Koobface worm or virus. This worm (which has
an ultimate goal of stealing personal financial information) spreads by
delivering Facebook messages to people who are friends of a Facebook
user whose computer has already been infected. The message directs the
recipients to a third-party website, where they are prompted to download
what is purported to be a legitimate file. However, if the file is downloaded and executed, it will infect their system as well.
A more recent example is the alleged attacks on Google and other corporate entities, which became public in mid-January 2010. Although the targets of these attacks were major commercial companies, they could just as
easily have been military, law enforcement, or government. The malware
was secreted in an encrypted image file hosted on a website maintained by
the attackers. The target was directed to the malicious website through a
carefully crafted "lure" email message. While it has not yet been proven, it
is not unreasonable to assume that the attackers researched the target's
personal preferences, hobbies, etc. using information that is publicly
available through social networking services in order to aid in the crafting
of the "lure" email, particularly given the pinpoint targeting of the target.
The purpose of this article is not to discuss the technical details of these
attacks. Nevertheless, there is one aspect of these attacks that stands out
as an emerging trend in cyber attacks in general. The success rate of the
attacks is astounding. Virtually all users who received the malicious email
were duped by the lure, and clicked on the link. Since it is obvious that the
success rate of the attack is directly proportional to the thoroughness of
its planning, it is quite clear that this attack was exceedingly well planned.
A major part of that planning likely involved carefully scoping the targets—quite possibly using social networking sites.

67

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3, No. 2

Journal of Strategic Security

Acquiring and Approaching the Target
One of the most critical components of a cyber attack through social networking sites is identifying a target. The attacker is typically looking for a
user who will have access to high level or sensitive information. In order
to help locate these users, the attacker may do some research using search
engines such as Google. Most corporate entities make at least part of their
corporate structure available on the public Internet. Military and law
enforcement agencies may have notices of appointment and/or promotion carried by the local press. All of this information is cataloged by
search engines and made generally available to anyone who looks.
Once a target is identified, the attacker cannot send a random email with
a link to the malicious site or the malware itself. Most computer users
know never to open attachments or click on links from unsolicited emails.
Additionally, by sending a random email, the attacker decreases the
chance of a successful attack. After all, the attacker must be reasonably
certain that the target will open the document, or click on the link and
thereby activate the payload. Trying to get someone who is afraid of
heights to open a document ostensibly containing a quote for mountaineering paraphernalia simply will not work.
The attacker may then turn to social networking services, looking for any
information that would make the target more easily compromised. Information of value could include upcoming events, travel plans, associates,
likes and dislikes, etc.—in short, just about anything that the attacker can
use to increase credibility. Supposing a scenario where the target does not
directly post any information that can be of use to an attacker, or if such
information is posted, it is not made available to those not on the target's
"friend list," the target may still be vulnerable. A savvy attacker can
attempt to become online "friends" with individuals on the target's "friend
list." He or she could then reach out to these associates to discuss what
appear to be topics of mutual interest, but in reality are attempts to learn
about the industry. The target may have configured the security settings
on the social networking service site to prohibit strangers from seeing the
profile, but to allow "friends of friends" to see it. This provides the
attacker with the information needed to construct a lure email message
which is likely to deceive the target.

Security through Obscurity
It should be clear from the above that social networking services can pose
a very real hazard to the security of corporate entities, government offi68
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cials, and law enforcement personnel. In order to protect their privacy,
and themselves, users should be encouraged to have as little personal
information as possible publicly available. Specifically, while it has
become popular for high-ranking government officials to reach out to
their constituents via social networking services, the security risks must
be borne in mind and addressed. Users should not make their profiles
available to everyone, and should avoid accepting friend requests from
unknown sources. Strangers online should be treated like strangers
offline—maintaining requisite politeness and distance. Consider that
unsolicited friend request as a request for personal information from a
person who sat next to you on a bus. No rational person would hand over
confidential information to a complete stranger.

Conclusion
Researchers have identified a paradox in the realm of security called the
"Paradox of Usable Security," which states that "The more secure the
technology, the less secure the system."17 In other words, the technological complexity of the security of a system is directly related to users'
attempts to circumvent it. This would seem to imply that having too much
security could be less than beneficial when not coupled with sound personnel security and accountability programs. At the same time, a deficiency in security can leave an organization vulnerable to attack. The
answer to this conundrum of course, is that security is a balancing act.
The challenge is to find the proper balance of security and productivity.
It is an unfortunate but very real fact is that we do not live in a world
where we can rely on all people to act in an honest and trustworthy manner all the time. As a society, we must constantly be vigilant, on the lookout for those who would attempt to deceive us, from within and outside. It
is important to realize that anyone can make use of social networking sites
and social engineering tactics to compromise operational and personal
security. Taking some commonsense steps to protect personal information can go a long way in protecting ourselves and our organizations from
those who seek to do us harm.
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